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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
the insured's refusal to attend trial, the Washington Court
also states that "there is another compelling reason why
respondent waived its defense of non-cooperation .. ."2
When the defendant left the state and failed to appear for
trial his attorney had the choice of asking for a continuance
or proceeding with the defense of the case without the
insured and he chose the latter. "Obviously this choice was
to improve its own position in any future attempt to enforce
liability under the policy. At this point, whom did the
attorney, employed by respondent [the insurer] to defend
the action, represent, the policyholder ... or the respond-
ent?" In answering its own question, the Court concluded
that he was in fact primarily representing the insurer.34
The majority of the courts favor imposing a waiver or
estoppel on the insurance company when an attorney who
it has employed breaches the principle embodied in Canon
6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. This approach should
have great success in curtailing the present day abuses
which exist in this area, and it is hoped the courts of
Maryland will restrict the instant decision to its exact facts.
The Court of Appeals left the door open to this by its
favorable recognition of the cases elsewhere and its decision
of the instant case on its peculiar facts.
DAVID S. CORDISH
Subordination Of Stockholder Loans On The Ground
Of Corporate Undercapitalization
Obre v. Alban Tractor Company'
In 1959 appellant and another individual formed a
Maryland corporation in accordance with a capital struc-
ture agreement providing for equal corporate control. In
" Van Dyke v. White, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P. 2d 430, 435 (1960).
'
3 Id., 436.
"The dissent in Van Dyke decided the case on the issue of whether the
injured party who has recovered a judgment against the insured, can
assert the rights of the assured. While the Van Dyke dissent answered
this in the negative, the majority and, it is submitted, better rule allows
the injured party the identical rights against the insurance company as
the insured. Thus, if the policyholder has breached the cooperation
clause of his policy, the injured party cannot recover from the insurer
of the policy; however, if the insurer has waived or become estopped
to assert this breach against the policyholder, it is also denied 'the right
to assert the breach against the injured party. The issue raised by the
Van Dyke dissent is rarely considered by the courts as applied to the
area under discussion. See 29A AM. JuR. 605, Insurance, § 1496 for
support of the majority approach.
'228 Md. 291, 179 A. 2d 861 (1962).
OBRE v. ALBAN TRACTOR CO.
return for transferring cash and equipment to commence
operations, each party received an equal amount of par
value voting common stock. Appellant, Obre, contributed
$63,874.86 worth of equipment and $1,673.24 in cash; Nelson,
the other founder, contributed $8,495.00 worth of equip-
ment and $1,505.00 in cash, a total of $75,548.10. Both took
back $10,000.00 in par value voting common stock, with
Obre taking in addition $20,000.00 par value non-voting
preferred stock and an unsecured five-year note for $35,-
548.10 (being 46.6% of the assets contributed). The cor-
poration was a financial failure, and in 1960 it executed a
deed of trust for the benefit of creditors. The Circuit Court
of Baltimore County, sitting in equity, assumed jurisdic-
tion over the trust. Appellant claimed that he was entitled
to share as a general creditor in the distribution of the cor-
poration's assets, up to the amount of his loan. Appellees,
general creditors of the corporation, excepted on the
grounds that since the corporation was undercapitalized
the loan represented a risk capital contribution and should
therefore, on equitable grounds, be subordinated to the
claims of the general creditors. The Chancellor sustained
appellees' exception because he felt that the corporation
could not have carried on its operations without the equip-
ment contributed by appellant and also, since the note was
dated on the day of incorporation, that the transaction was
not a loan but really a risk capital contribution. On appeal
this decision was reversed, the Court of Appeals ruling that
the stated capital, $40,000.00, under the circumstances
seemed to be adequate capitalization2 and that the carrying
out of the corporate plan in good faith in no way inequi-
tably harmed the general creditors.3
Where a shareholder has loaned money to a corporation,
and subsequently a third party in granting credit to the
corporation is led to believe that the shareholder's loan is
actually a contribution to capital, most courts have little
difficulty in holding that the loan should be considered
equity capital, and therefore subordinated, on the grounds
of fraud, misrepresentation or estoppel.' Since the late
2 Inadequate capitalization and undercapitalization as used in this article
do not refer to the statutory definitions of unpaid subscriptions, but
rather to an economic concept arising when the funds represented by
shares of stock are insufficient to carry on a business. Costello v. Fazio,
256 F. 2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958).
8 Supra, n. 1, 295-297.
4Coffman v. Maryland Publishing Co., 167 Md. 275, 173 A. 248 (1934);
Hock & Co. v. Strohm, 166 Md. 253, 170 A. 738 (1934) ; Dollar Cleansers
v. McGregor, 163 Md. 105, 161 A. 159 (1932) ; Carozza v. Federal Finance
& Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 A. 332, 43 A.L.R. 1 (1925). Hanson v.
Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E. 2d 259 (1937) ; Albert Richards Co. Inc.
19631
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nineteenth century, the rule in England has been more
favorable to the shareholder in that it gives effect to the
corporate entity even though the corporation was created
solely for the purpose of insulating the assets of the sole
incorporator from the claims of general creditors.5 While
there was some indication that the Maryland Court of
Appeals might have followed the English rule,6 it is now
clear that Maryland's view is contrary and representative
of the majority view in the United States.7
A typical case involving fraud, misrepresentation or es-
toppel was Cantor v. Baltimore Overall Mfg. Co.' Officers
of a corporation that subsequently became insolvent in-
duced creditor to sell the corporation goods on credit by
representing to him that a loan which shareholder had
made to the corporation was an addition to capital. It was
held that the lender could not be considered a bona ftde
creditor and that his "loan" would have to be subordinated.
A leading Maryland case is Dollar Cleansers v. Mc-
Gregor,9 where the shareholder's transaction lacked good
faith because the mortgaged property was overvalued and
the mortgagee-shareholder knew he was leaving the cor-
poration with no assets to protect the creditors. The Court,
after noting the general rule that a valid loan by a share-
holder can be made, and that the corporate entity will only
be disregarded to prevent fraud or imposition, or to enforce
a paramount equity, stated:
v. The Mayfair, Inc., 287 Mass. 280, 191 N.E. 430 (1934). BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS (1946) §§ 129, 139; 6 M.L.E., Corporations, §§ 123, 127.
Claims by the Internal. Revenue Service that a corporation is too thinly
capitalized and that "loans" should be treated as capital and taxed as
such, have 'been made where the corporation is financially successful.
See infra, n. 18.
1 In Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] A.C. 22, an enterpreneur
with an established business transferred the business to a private corpo-
ration with his family as incorporators and sole shareholders. He took
back very little stock, but did' get debentures secured by a first lien on
all the company's assets. In an insolvency proceeding, the House of Lords
reversed the lower court, holding it proper to create what in effect was
a judgment proof corporation where the incorporator took all of the
possible profits without running any risk of loss.
IIn Steel Co. v. Concrete 'Pile Co., 141 Md. 67, 85, 118 A. 279 (1922),
a case involving a tort suit by the widow of defendant's employer, where
in order to hold defendant liable it would have required piercing the
corporate veil, the Court referred to the Salomon case (supra, n. 5) saying it
was practically adopted. in Tomkins v. Sperry, Jones & Co., 96 Md. 560,
581, 54 A. 254 (1903). (It does not appear that the Salomon case has
subsequently been mentioned by the Court of Appeals).
'While not mentioning the Salomon case (supra, n. 5) the case of
Dollar Cleansers v. McGregor, 163 Md. 105, 161 A. 159 (1932), in effect
overrules the import of the Salomon case. See text to a. 10, infra. See
also Cataldo, Limited Liability With One-Man Companies and Subsidiary
Corporations, 18 Law & Contemp. Probs. 471, 480 (1953).
8121 Md. 65, 87 A. 1115 (1913).
9163 Md. 105, 161 A. 159 (1932). See supra, n. 7.
OBRE v. ALBAN TRACTOR CO.
"But its [a shareholder's loan] bona fides is always
open to inquiry. This Court does not think the law con-
templates that one may incorporate an established
business of his own, continue to own and control it as
before, and at the same time, for his personal benefit,
put beyond the reach of prospective creditors, all the
assets of the corporation."'10
In the Dollar case and others similar to it," the courts were
largely subordinating loans because of some voluntary
action on the part of the shareholder which in equity should
not be allowed.
In the instant case, although appellant contributed sub-
stantially more assets than his co-incorporator, the planned
corporate structure was for equal control from the outset
and eventually equal ownership. Equal control was ac-
hieved by alloting equal voting shares to both parties. To
facilitate equal ownership and at the same time maintain
sufficient equity capital, appellant took back preferred
shares and the note in question, which, when extinguished,
would decrease his proportion of financial investment. The
fact that the note was payable five years from the date of
incorporation was not evidence of intent to create equity
capital since that was done merely to gain a tax advantage.
Also the note carried interest at five percent which indi-
cated that the parties intended it to be a bona fide debt of
the corporation. By regularly listing the loan on the firm's
financial reports and the stock issuance certificate it showed
lack of intent to conceal the transaction from appellees or
any prospective creditors. The Court accorded great weight
Id., 109.
'The case of Home News, Inc. v. Goodman, 182 Md. 585, 35 A. 2d 446
(1944), which dealt with personal shareholder liability, is analogous to
the problem in the Obre case. There appellee, an advertising solicitor.
sued appellants, Home News, Inc. and its two owners, for certain com-
missions due arising out of an oral contract. Home News, Inc. was
incorporated for the specific purpose of printing a shopping center news-
paper; it had no assets of its own, but all property used belonged to
a partnership of which the individual appellants were officers and sole
owners. The office and personnel of the corporation were the same as
those used by the partnership, and the financing of the corporation was
accomplished by using partnership credit. The Court found that the
corporation' lacked any equity capital and, since there was so much inter-
mingling of the two businesses, affirmed a personal judgment against the
individual owners of the corporation. Also the appellee had m'ake-
weight grounds of estoppel on the basis of a shareholder's statement at
pp. 590-591: "Don't worry about that, [his incorporating] that is merely
a form to protect my interests in case I am sued, but I am the boss around
here and you look to me." See also Hock & Co. v. Strohm, 166 Md. 253,
170 A. 738 (1934) (Blank credit reports made without shareholder's
knowledge not stating the corporate indebtedness to her, did not induce
creditors. Shareholder-creditor was allowed pro rata recovery on her
loan).
1963] 263
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to the good faith of this arrangement, especially since ac-
complished with the guidance of reputable consultants.
Since the plan lacked bad faith and conformed to accepted
commercial practice, the Court concluded that the appellees
failed to meet the burden of showing that the corporation
was undercapitalized.
The modern trend in dealing with undercapitalization
stems from Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co.," the famous
"Deep Rock" case. There, undercapitalization of a sub-
sidiary,13 together with gross mismanagement and fraudu-
lent conduct in connection with leasing arrangements
which drained the subsidiary of its assets, was the basis for
subordinating the parent corporation's loans. 4 While the
implications of the decision have caused much conflict
among the courts," the rule that bankruptcy courts are
inherently courts of equity emerged as a settled principle. 6
The Taylor court used a "fairness" approach to determine
whether loans should be subordinated, rather than simply
an examination of the formal requirement of separate
entity.17 This concept, which has since consistently been
followed by the courts, appears preferable because it
stresses the realities of the problem of undercapitalization,
rather than the artificial niceties of corporate form."'
-. 906 U.S. 307 (1939).
"8 The relationship between a parent and a subsidiary and a sole share-
holder and his corporation are similar, and their problems are analogous
in cases where undercapitalization is alleged. BATLANTINE, COIORATIONS
(1946) §§ 129, 139.
"Preferred stock was also subordinated.
"For a discussion of the conflict see Israels, The Implications and
Limitation of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 42 Col. L. Rev. 376 (1942);
Krotinger, The "Deep Rock" Doctrine: A Realistic Approach to Parent-
Subsidiary Law, 42 Col. L. Rev. 1134 (1942); Bayne, The Deep Rock
Doctrine Reconsidered, 19 Ford. L. Rev. 43 (1950) ; Stroia, Deep Rock - A
Post Mortem, 34 U. of Det. L.J. 279 (1957).
1' See Pepper v. Linton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas
& Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) ; Local Loan Company v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234 (1934). The Maryland Court of Appeals has stated that it will
subordinate on equitable grounds, although it is questionable whether it
would do so solely on the grounds of undercapitalization. See Dollar
Cleansers v. McGregor, 163 Md. 105, 161 A. 159 (1932).
"7Gleick, The Equitable Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Subordinate
Claims or to Disallow Claims Entirely on Equitable Grounds: A Discus-
sion of Developments, 33 J.N.A. Referees Bank 69 (1959).
'
8 In Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F. 2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941) decided two years
after the Deep Rock decision, one Arnold, in forming a brewery corpo-
ration, contributed $50,000 in return for stock and in the same year ad-
vanced about $75,000 worth of loans. After two years of prosperity the
corporiation began to lose money, and Arnold made further advances of
about $50,000. Both of these loans were secured by a mortgage, and thus
Arnold sought to come in ahead of the general creditors. Upon insolvency
the amount originally advanced as loans was held to be equity capital
since in large part it was used to construct the factory, but the amount
subsequently contributed to sustain the failing corporation was not
subordinated. It appears from the decision that there was no fraud, but
1963] OBRE v. ALBAN TRACTOR CO.
In determining when undercapitalization exists, it ap-
pears that the test most used by the courts is as follows:
Would an average businessman, in establishing such a cor-
poration, consider the amount contributed as adequate
capital? - in other words, a reasonable businessman test.
Apparently the instant case adopts this test.' 9 Since it
obviously requires a determination of facts, its application
will result in varying conclusions depending on the nature
of the corporation's business. Costello v. Fazio" furnishes
insight to the application of this test in the specific in-
stance where an existing partnership incorporates. There,
the Court gave great weight to the fact that when exper-
ience as to how much was required to operate a partnership
has already been established from partnership's previous
operation, the newly formed corporation's capital should
be similar.
Arnold was penalized for exercising poor business judgment since the
amount subordinated was what in equity he should have contributed to
establish the corporation. Maryland has adhered to the distinction be-
tween loans made initially to finance a corporation and those made
subsequently to sustain a failing corporation; cf. Dollar Cleansers v.
McGregor, 163 Md. 105, 161 A. 159 (1932) where loans given to start a
corporation initially were subordinated, land Coffman v. Maryland Pub-
lishing Co., 167 Md. 275, 173 A. 248 (1934) where loans made to continue
operations of a business were held not to be invalid. Apparently, the
lower court in the Obre case reasoned that the fact the note in question
was dated the same day as incorporation was of paramount significance;
however, the Court of Appeals decision shows that this does not con-
clusively indicate a risk capital transaction.
In the recent case of Costello v. Fazio, 256 F. 2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958),
three partners of an already established partnership with assets of
about $51,000 decided to incorporate. The partners took back $6,000 in
capital stock and $45,000 in, notes, the apparent motive being to achieve
favorable tax treatment. (Basically the favorable tax treatment of a
thinly capitalized corporation is that interest paid on loans by share-
holders is deductible as an expense to the corporation whereas dividends
on stock are not.) The referee's decision that there was no fraud or
deception practiced on the creditors was upheld by the District Court in
not allowing subordination. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
rejecting appellees' argument that fraud and mismanagement must always
be present if claims are to be subordinated where there is under-
capitalization. (The appellees' argument was based on Taylor v. Standard
Gas & Elec. Co., supra, n. 13. The Court answered this by saying that
fraud and mismanagement did not have to be present as long as the case
presented a situation where it would be equitable to subordinate). Under
these federal cases, apparently there need be no affirmative fraud or mis-
representation on the part of a shareholder to subordinate his loan.
19 Obre v. Alban Tractor Company, 228 Md. 291, 179 A. 2d 861 (1962)
quotes with approval from LATIN, CORPORATIONS (1959) Ch. 2, § 5(a),
"Probably no more should be expected of men who start a new
enterprise than what reasonably prudent men with a general knowl-
edge of the particular type of business and its hazards would deter-
mine was reasonable capitalization in the light of any special circum-
stances which existed at the time of incorporation of the now defunct
enterprise."
256 F. 2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958).
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A ratio test has been suggested in which an established
ratio of loans to capital would determine whether the
corporation was adequately capitalized, and if that ratio is
exceeded then the loans would be subordinated.21 This test
offers easy administration, but has not been adopted by
judicial decision or legislation. Another suggested test to
determine if undercapitalization exists depends on whether
or not an informed outside source would have made a loan
similar in amount to the one in question.2 2 The Maryland
Court seems to consider this as a factor but not as a test
in itself.23
The Court's holding in the instant case leaves some
doubt as to whether Maryland will ever subordinate a
shareholder loan purely on the ground of undercapitaliza-
tion. The Court stated that since corporate records are
available to any prospective creditor, he assumes the risk
of discovering any information about the capital structure
which may harm his position.24 The Court was really not
faced with making this decision since after scrutinizing the
corporate structure, it did conclude that the corporation
was not undercapitalized, and it appears that under any of
the tests they reached a correct result. However, the fact
that the Court did so carefully examine the corporate struc-
ture would make it appear that this equitable consideration
is of prime importance and the presumption that every
prospective creditor is aware of the corporation's financial
condition is only of make-weight value.
ROBERT W. BAKER
Appeal By A Court Appointed Fiduciary From An
Order Of Discharge
Hundley v. Hundley'
The appellants (wife and business associate of the ap-
pellee) were appointed co-committee and co-trustee of the
2See discussion in Semmel, Tam Consequences of Inadequate Capitaliza-
tion, 48 Col. L. Rev. 202 (1948). Query: Would a court under this test
subordinate only that amount which exceeds the accepted ratio?
22Ibid.
""There can be no question but that, if a third party had advanced the
money represented by Obre's note, he would validly be considered a
creditor of the corporation." Supra, n. 19.
24The Court made its own determination that under a reasonable
businessman test the corporation was not undercapitalized. The lowest
ratio test proposed was a one to one ratio which was met, see Semmel,
supra, n. 21, and the Court indicated this loan would have been made
from an outside source. Ibid.
'Hundley v. Hundley, 229 Md. 393, 182 A. 2d 884 (1962).
